Matthew C. Harris and Gary S. Harris v. Utah Transit Authority and Lester Lorenzo Loosemore : Reply Brief of Appellants by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1981
Matthew C. Harris and Gary S. Harris v. Utah
Transit Authority and Lester Lorenzo Loosemore :
Reply Brief of Appellants
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
Merlin R. Lybbert; Paul C. Droz; Snow, Christensen & Martineau; Attorneys for Appellants;
Timothy R. Hanson; Hanson, Russon, Hanson & Dunn; Attorneys for Respondents;
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Harris v. Utah Transit Authority, No. 17042 (Utah Supreme Court, 1981).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/2290
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
MATTHEW C. HARRIS 
and GARY s. HARRIS, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
vs. 
THE UTAH TRANSIT AUTHORITY 
and LESTER LORENZO LOOSEMORE, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
No. 17042 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
HONORABLE RONALD O. HYDE 
TIMOTHY R. HANSON 
MERLIN R. LYBBERT 
PAUL C. DROZ 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Appellants 
Matthew C. Harris and 
Gary s. Harris 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Off ice Box 3000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Telephone: 521-9000 
HANSON, RUSSON, HANSON & DUNN 
Attorneys for Respondents 
Utah Transit Authority and 
Lester Lorenzo Loosemore 
650 Clark Leaming Off ice Center 
175 South West Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
FI l ED 
DEC 111981 
~·····-.- ... ·------··-·-----·-·-------·miiiliiil 
Cler~ Suprem9 Court, Utah 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
MATTHEW C. HARRIS 
and GARY S. HARRIS, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
vs. No. 17042 
THE UTAH TRANSIT AUTHORITY 
and LESTER LORENZO LOOSEMORE, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
HONORABLE RONALD 0. HYDE 
TIMOTHY R. HANSON 
MERLIN R. LYBBERT 
PAUL C. DROZ 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Appellants 
Matthew c. Harris and 
Gary s. Harris 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Off ice Box 3000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Telephone: 521-9000 
HANSON, RUSSON, HANSON & DUNN 
Attorneys for Respondents 
Utah Transit Authority and 
Lester Lorenzo Loosemore 
650 Clark Leaming Off ice Center 
175 South West Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
CASES CITED 
Anderson v. Parson. Red-E-Mix Paving Co., 
24 Utah 2d 128, 467 P.2d 45 .•..•. 
Chard v. Bowen, 
427 P.2d 568 (Idaho 1967) ...•. 
General Ins. Co. of America v. Lewis, 
121 Utah 440, 243 P.2d 433 (1952) . 
Hillyard v. Utah By-Products Co., 
1 Utah 2d 143, 263 P.2d 287 (1953). 
Horrocks v. Rounds, 
370 P.2d 799 (N.M. 1962) 
Jensen v. Mountain States Tel. and Tel. Co., 
611 P.2d 363 (Utah 1980) .....• 
McElhaney v. Rouse, 
415 P.2d 241 (Kan. 1966) 
McMurdie v. Underwood, 
9 Utah 2d 400, P.2d 711 (1959) .. 
Stapley v. Salt Lake City Lines, 
18 Utah 2d 1, 414 P.2d 88 (1966). 
Velasquez v.Greyhound Lines, Inc., 
12 Utah 2d 379, 366 P.2d 989 (1961) 
Watters v. Querry, 
588 P.2d 702 (Utah 1978) 
Watters v. Querry, 
626 P.2d 455 (utah 1981} 
-ii-
7,8,9,15 
19,20 
21 
9,10,11,1~ 
14,15,16,1 
22 
19 
10,16,22 
19 
13,14,15 
10,15 
7,8,9,13 
10,15,17,2~ 
10,15,22 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
MATTHEW C. HARRIS 
and GARY S. HARRIS, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
vs. No. 17042 
THE UTAH TRANSIT AUTHORITY 
and LESTER LORENZO LOOSEMORE, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
INTRODUCTION 
The nature of the case, disposition by the lower court, 
relief sought on appeal, and facts have been thoroughly and 
accurately discussed in appellants' initial brief, and will 
not be repeated here, except as discussed in the following 
arguments. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THE JEEP 
DRIVER NEGLIGENT AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
I. The facts in evidence presented a jury question on the 
issue of jeep driver Talbot's negligence. 
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Reasonable minds could differ on the issue of the jeep 
driver's (Talbot's) negligence. Substantial evidence in the 
record, viewed in the light most favorable to Talbot demon-
strates: 
1. There were no tail lights or signals operating on 
the rear of the bus immediately prior to the accident (Rec-
ord cited at Appellants' Brief, p. 4) in violation of Utah 
law. §41-6-121.10, Utah Code Ann. (1953); Instruction No. 12 
(R. 251). 
2. The bus driver (Loosernore) could have safely pulled 
the bus completely off the highway in order to pick up his 
passenger (Record cited at Appellants' Brief, pp. 2; 7, n. 
5). That Loosemore stopped where he did was a violation of 
Utah law. §41-6-101, Utah Code Ann. (1953); Instruction No. 
11 (R. 249-50). Loosemore himself testified that there was 
nothing that would have prevented him from pulling off the 
highway another ten feet. (R. 625). In fact the bus pulled 
gradually over to the right over the course of 300 feet of 
travel to where its right rear wheel was only four inches off 
the pavement (R. 514; Plaintiffs' Exhibits No. 21 and No. 5). 
3. The highway was straight and posted at 50 m.p.h., 
with no semaphores or stop signs for several miles (R. 529). 
Prior to the accident, jeep driver Talbot was traveling with 
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the flow of traffic, within the posted speed limit at between 
40 and 50 m.p.h. {R. 521, 549, 567, 577, 591, 728). 
4. Bus driver Loosemore checked his rear view mirrors 
300 feet from the waiting passenger, and did not look at his 
mirrors again before the collision {R. 620). The only car he 
saw was a light colored station wagon and he made his stop-
ping maneuver in the manner he did under the impression that 
the light colored station wagon was the only affected vehi-
cle. {R. 618). In fact, Talbot's jeep was closer to the bus 
than the light colored station wagon; it was the first vehi-
cle affected by the stopping bus. {R. 576, 592). 
5. At the instant of collision the bus was still stop-
ping or had just stopped. {R. 561). 
6. Jeep driver Talbot did not recall seeing the bus 
before the instant he perceived the dangerous situation and 
then reacted by swerving in an attempt to avoid colliding 
with the bus. He may have seen the bus before that instant, 
but it did not "register" with him before that instant (R. 
558). Similarly, Helen Hollingshead, driver of the light 
colored station wagon immediately behind the jeep, also had 
no conscious memory of seeing the bus until "suddenly the 
space between the jeep and the bus, and myself and the jeep 
was getting narrow" {R. 579-80). In order to herself avoid a 
collision, she swerved across three traffic lanes, including 
-3-
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two oncoming traffic lanes and stopped on the opposite side 
of the road (R. 579, 593). 
7. Emmet Quinn, an expert in the field of accident re-
construction, testified that it was entirely reasonable under 
these circumstances that jeep driver Talbot did not perceive 
that the bus was stopping until Talbot was relatively close 
to the bus. Based on the location of Talbot's skid marks, 
and a one and one-half second "perception - reaction" time, 
Quinn testified that Talbot was 150 feet from the point of 
impact when Talbot first became aware the bus was stopping 
(R. 729). He testified that, absent stop signal lights, the 
only way Talbot would perceive that the bus was stopping was 
-the increasing size of the bus, i.e., the increasing portion 
of Talbot's "cone of perception" taken by the bus (738). 
Quinn testified that until Talbot was relatively close to the 
bus, it would not appear to him to be stopping (738, 750). 
At the point Talbot perceived that the bus was stopping it 
had suddenly become three times larger in his "cone of per-
ception" (737). Quinn testified that the very purpose of 
tail lights is to warn a person in the rear of a slowing or 
stopping maneuver (738). Without such lights, a slowing or 
stopping maneuver is very difficult to perceive until the 
driver in the rear is relatively close to the stopping vehi-
cle (738, 750). In fact, Quinn testified that from the point 
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where Talbot perceived the bus and reacted, he made the best 
possible effort to avoid the accident (740-41). Quinn illus-
trated his testimony with a chart admitted as plaintiffs' 
Exhibit 44. 
The foregoing facts are sufficient to preclude a directed 
finding of negligence against jeep driver Talbot and the 
trial court erred in taking that issue from the jury. 
Respondents argue that the jeep driver's negligence is 
clear based upon his failure "to see a stopped bus which was 
10 feet wide and 12 feet high on a clear dry morning with no 
obstacles in front of the jeep and with a two mile straight-
away preceding the location of the bus." (Respondents' 
Brief, p. 13). That argument fails to take into account the 
evidence discussed in the preceding paragraphs numbered one 
through seven. Particularly it fails to recognize that the 
bus had no stop or signal lights, that it stopped in the 
travel lane in a 50 m.p.h. stretch of highway, that the bus 
had been progressing in the flow of traffic down the highway 
creating the expectation to following cars that absent a sig-
nal or brake light on the bus or at least a significant move-
ment to the right off the highway, it would continue to move 
down the highway with the flow of traffic. Plaintiffs have 
never contended that the bus was not visible to following 
traffic: rather plaintiffs contend that under the circum-
-5-
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stances drivers following the bus reasonably did not perceive 
that the bus had created a dangerous situation; they reason-
ably did not perceive it as stopping until it had nearly 
stopped. 
That jeep driver Talbot and Helen Hollingshead in the 
light colored station wagon were caught by surprise by the 
stopping bus is discussed above. Two cars back from Hol-
lingshead was Gloria Myers who observed the situation, in-
cluding the jeep and the station wagon swerving to avoid col-
lision. Myers testified on cross-examination as follows: 
Q. Did you see the bus as it was slowing down? 
A. Sir, I didn't realize the bus was slowing down or 
stopping. We didn't have any indication it was stopping. 
(R. 597) 
To accept respondents' argument that the bus was large 
and visible is to conclude that large vehicles are excused 
from the law requiring brake and turn signal lights. That is 
untenable. Respondents have not even addressed the testimony 
of expert witness Quinn discussed above in paragraph number 
7, regarding the difficulty in perceiving a stopping maneuver 
absent stop or turn signal lights, nor have they addressed 
the actual difficulty which Hollingshead and Myers, in addi-
tion to Talbot, had in perceiving that the bus was stopping. 
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II Respondents' cases. 
Respondent relies on two cases in support of the trial 
court's finding of Talbot's negligence as a matter of law: 
Velasquez v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 12 Utah 2d 379, 366 P.2d 
989 (1961), and Anderson v. Parson Red-E-Mix Paving Co., 24 
Utah 2d 128, 467 P.2d 45 (1970). Both cases are factually 
distinguishable and therefore not useful. 
In Velasguez a collision occurred between an Interstate 
Motor Lines truck, which was stopped partially in a travel 
lane, and a moving Greyhound bus. "The truck's clearance 
lights, stop lights, and blinkers were turned on before the 
driver alighted, and they remained on." 366 P.2d at 990. 
That fact alone distinguishes Velasguez, but there is more: 
The Greyhound bus driver, by his own admission saw 
the Interstate truck as he approached. He said he 
first observed it from about three-fourths mile away 
and that he realized that both the truck and the 
Buckley car were stopped while he was still one-half 
mile away. 366 P.2d at 990 (emphasis added). 
In that context, the Velasquez court stated that "if 
there had been flares out, or even if the truck had been 
aflame, it could have given him no-more information." Id. 
The court continued: 
[The bus driver] said he intended to stop behind the 
truck to render assistance and to add the benefit of 
his lights to the scene •••• The evidence is with-
out dispute that as the Greyhound bus approached 
this scene a very strange thing happened: the bus 
driver momentarily lost consciousness by either 
falling asleep or blacking out from some other 
-7-
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cause. He was roused to consciousness just before 
the impact by the warning cry of a woman passenger: 
"Don't hit it." He swerved the bus to the left but 
not in time to avoid hitting the left rear corner of 
the truck. 366 P.2d at 991. 
Thus, in addition to undisputed evidence of operating 
clearance lights, stop lights and blinkers, the approaching 
bus driver in Velasquez correctly perceived the stopped vehi-
cles while he was a half-mile away. Nevertheless he collided 
with it. On those facts a directed finding of negligence may 
be appropriate, but those facts are far different from the 
facts in the instant case. Velasquez, therefore, does not 
support the directed negligence finding against Talbot herein. 
In Anderson, supra, a Red-E-Mix cement truck driver had 
parked his truck against the curb about 150 feet from an in-
tersection in Brigham City. He was engaged in washing out 
his truck when it was struck by plaintiff's host's vehicle. 
The driver of that vehicle was 15 years old and had taken the 
automobile without leave. Plaintiff and another boy, both 
also age 15, were passengers. The driver stopped his car at 
the intersection and waited for oncoming traffic to clear so 
he could turn left. He started to make his left turn when he 
over-accellerated causing the car to slide. The court stated 
plaintiff's version of the facts, in the light most favorable 
to him, as follows: 
While he was thus proceeding west with the read end 
in a sideways slide and approximately 50 feet west 
-a-
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of the curb line, he first noticed the defendant's 
truck parked on the roadway. The driver at that 
point had sufficiently regained control and he 
thought he could avoid collision by proceeding to 
the southwest and around the left side of the truck, 
but he failed to observe the steel chute extending 
to the rear and collided with the extended chute •. 
467 P.2d at 46 (emphasis original). 
The Supreme Court affirmed the Anderson trial court's 
granting of a motion to dismiss following trial, reasoning 
that the driver had acknowledged observing the cement truck 
which was "stan~ing there as big as life and twice as nat-
ural." Having regained control of his sliding vehicle, he 
"had about 100 feet in which to brake and/or turn aside and 
avoid the collision with this large truck which stood there 
in plain sight." 467 P.2d at 47. 
Again, those facts are not our facts. Both Velasquez and 
Anderson are cases in which the following driver observed a 
static situation ahead and negligently failed to avoid it. 
The Supreme Court carefully analyzed both those cases as fit-
ting the "first situation" discussed in Hillyard v. Utah 
By-Products Co., 1 Utah 2d 143, 263 P.2d 287 (1953) 
Hillyard's "first situation" deals with static situations 
where the dangerous condition, i.e., a vehicle stopped within 
the travel lane of following vehicles, has been in place for 
a period of time and under circumstances which legally and 
reasonably impose upon all arriving drivers' knowledge of its 
presence and appreciation of the danger. In such cases the 
-9-
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approaching driver's negligence becomes an intervening and 
thus sole proximate cause, and that negligence and proximate 
cause may exist as a matter of law. 
Hillyard's "second situation" deals with dynamic situa-
tions where the first driver's conduct and the following 
driver's conduct are concurrent, or so nearly so, that the 
following driver's conduct cannot be held to be negligence or 
proximate cause as a matter of law. In such cases, both the 
issues of negligence and proximate cause are for the jury. 
For example, in Stapley v. Salt Lake City Lines, 18 Utah 
2d 1, 414 P.2d 88 (1966) (discussed in more detail in appel-
lants brief, p. 8), involving nearly identical facts to the 
instant case, the Court approved the submission of the ap-
preaching driver's negligence to the jury, stating that the 
jury is properly the 
arbiter of the facts, negligence, contributory 
negligence, cause of the injury, and the like • 
414 P.2d at 89. 
Watters v. Querry, 588 P.2d 702 (Utah 1978), hereinafter 
"Watters I"; Jensen v. Mountain States Tel. and Tel. Co., 611 
P.2d 363 (Utah 1980); and Watters v. Querry, 626 P.2d 455 
(Utah 1981), hereinafter "Watters II", are all recent Utah 
cases involving Hillyard's "second situation." In each case 
the jury was allowed to consider the issue Of the approaching 
driver's negligence. In Watters I and.!.!.' this was true even 
-10-
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though the approaching driver was admittedly momentarily in-
attentive, which is the worst that can be said of jeep driver 
Talbot herein. 
The present case is one in which the facts giving rise to 
the accident were dynamic, and within Hillyard's "second sit-
uation" discussed above. Therefore all issues of negligence 
and proximate cause should have been submitted to the jury. 
POINT II 
INSTRUCTION NO. 14 IMPROPERLY STATES THE 
LAW AND IN EFFECT DIRECTS JUDGMENT AGAINST 
THE PLAINTIFF 
Instruction No. 14 (R. 253) is quoted in appellants' and 
respondents' briefs. In that instruction the trial court: 
1. Directs negligence against jeep driver Talbot; 
2. In effect directs a finding that Talbot's negligence 
was the sole proximate cause, using Hillyard's "first situa-
tion" language; and 
3. Improperly instructs on the Hillyard "second situa-
tion." 
The error in directing negligence against Talbot has al-
ready been discussed at length. Compounding that error is 
the manner in which that directed negligence is tied to prox-
imate cause in Instruction No. 14: 
To be an independent intervening cause that 
would relieve another's negligence from being a 
-11-
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proximate cause, it must be negligence that was not 
foreseeable. 
In that regard, you are instructed that the 
driver of the Jeep, Rodney Talbot, was negligent as 
a matter of law, and if you find that he observed 
the bus stopped upon the highway, or, under the cir-
cumstances should have observed the bus, but because 
of his negligence failed to do so in time to avoid 
the accident, then you are instructed that the neg-
ligence on his part was the sole proximate cause of 
the collision. (Emphasis added) • 
The only negligence claimed against Talbot was his negli-
gent failure to observe the bus in time to avoid it. That 
negligence is what the court directed. Thus, under this in-
struction the conclusion that Talbot's negligence was the 
sole proximate cause is inescapable. 
With Talbot thus having been found negligent and the sole 
proximate cause of the accident, how could the jury find 
other than "no negligence" on the part of bus driver and bus 
company? In effect the court excused any negligent conduct 
(improper stopping, no tail lights, improper lookout, etc.) 
on the part of the defendants by finding Talbot negligent and 
in effect, the sole proximate cause. 
Respondents argue that this instruction correctly covers 
the situation of "whether Talbot had sufficient time to 
observe the bus but failed to do so and, consequently, was 
the sole proximate cause of the accident." (Respondents' 
Brief p. 24). However, the correct test is more than just 
"time" -- it is perception and appreciation of the danger, 
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yet negligence in avoiding that danger. That perception and 
appreciation was not present here due to Loosemore's stopping 
where he did, without lights, etc, as discussed above. 
Respondents further claim that this portion of Instruc-
tion No. 14 is proper because it closely resembles that given 
in McMurdie v. Underwood, 9 Utah 2d 400, 346 P.2d 711 
(1959). That it closely resembles the McMurdie instruction 
is reason enough to conclude its inappropriateness here. 
McMurdie, like Velasquez and Anderson, supra, also relied 
upon by respondents, is a Hillyard "first situation" case. 
In McMurdie, at about 1:45 a.m. a driver named Whittaker 
stopped for several large trailer-trucks, some of which had 
blocked Whittaker's lane of travel. Whittaker waited for 
oncoming traffic to clear before attempting to pass the 
trailer-trucks. The court stated: 
While parked in this position Whittaker noticed in 
his rear view mirror the approach of a speeding 
pickup truck. He pressed his brakes hard to light 
the bright red rear lights of his car and he also 
turned on his turn signal light. The pickup truck 
continued coming until it crashed into the rear of 
[Whittaker's] automobile. 346 P.2d at 712 (Emphasis 
added) • 
The occupants of Whittaker's car were severely injured. 
On those facts, at the pretrial conference, the court held 
the pickup truck driver negligent as a matter of law. The 
pickup driver then settled all claims against her. The case 
then proceeded to trial with Whittaker and his occupants 
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seeking to recover against the drivers of the large trailer-
trucks who had blocked Whittaker's travel lane. The court 
instructed the jury as follows: 
You are instructed that the driver of the pick-
up truck was negligent as a matter of law, and if 
you find that she observed the hazards, if any, of 
the stopped vehicles upon the highway or under the 
circumstances should have observed said vehicles, 
but because of her negligence failed to do so in 
· time to avoid said accident, then you are instructed 
that the ne~ligence on her part was the sole proxi-
mate cause of the collision, and your verdict must 
be in favor of the defendants and against the plain-
tiffs, no cause of action. 
Several obvious factual distinctions make that same in-
struction erroneous in the instant case. It was undisputed 
in McMurdie that the brake lights and turn signals were oper-
ating on the stopped vehicle, and there was therefore not the 
"perception of stopping" problem testified to by Emmmett 
Quinn in the instant case. McMurdie is thus clearly a Hill-
yard "first situation" case. 
McMurdie also involved a speeding approaching vehicle 
which was further evidence of that driver's negligence. 
There are no such facts of negligence against jeep driver 
Talbot. 
Justice Wade dissented in McMurdie, agreeing with appel-
lants' contention there that the instruction 
directed a verdict against them: 
This instruction in effect directs a verdict 
against plaintiffs. It declares the pickup truck 
-14-
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driver negligent as a matter of law. Then it 
directs a finding that such driver's negligence was 
the sole proximate cause of the accident and a ver-
dict agai~st plaintiffs if the jury finds her negli-
gent on either one of the only two grounds of negli-
gence chargeable against her. I think this instruc-
tion was erroneous. 346 P.2d at 714. 
After analyzing Hillyard and related cases, Justice Wade 
concluded: 
[T]he second driver must not only see the 
parked truck but appreciate the danger in order to 
exonerate the original tort-feasor. This, I think, 
is the correct rule and requires extraordinary 
negligence on the part of the second tort-feasor to 
relieve the first from liability. 346 P.2d at 717 
(emphasis added). 
That extraordinary negligence takes the form of Hill-
yard's "first situation", where the approaching vehicle saw, 
or could not have failed to have seen the dangerous situa-
tion, yet negligently failed to avoid it. That was the case 
in Velasquez (bus driver saw stopped truck and recognized 
situation one-half mile away); Anderson (car driver had con-
trol of own vehicle, saw stopped cement truck but negligently 
failed to miss it); and McMurdie (stopped vehicle had stop 
lights and turn signals operating -- approaching speeding car 
observed but failed to avoid collision). That extraordinary 
negligence is not present in the instant case, nor was it 
present in Watters I or II, even though the approaching 
driver there was admittedly inattentive. It was not present 
in Stapley v. s. L. c. Lines, which has facts nearly 
identical 
-15-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
to the instant case, nor was it present in Hillyard's "second 
situation", where the approaching driver failed to see the 
dangerous situation until too late to avoid it. All of those 
cases, similar to the instant case, submitted the negligence 
and proximate cause issues to the jury. 
The concluding paragraph of Instruction No. 14 in the 
instant case further compounds its error. That portion 
states: 
If you find Talbot did not observe the bus in 
time to avoid it, and it could reasonably be anti-
cipated that circumstances may arise wherein one may 
not observe such a dangerous condition until too 
late to escape (i.e., reasonably anticipated that an 
emergency might arise), then his negligence would 
not be the sole proximate cause. (R. 253). 
Respondents argue that the above instruction correctly 
covers the situation of "whether Talbot was put into an 
emergency situation in which he had no time to observe the 
bus ••• " They argue that "the evidence showed no emergency 
situation." (Respondents' brief, pp. 24, 27). Their narrow 
reliance on emergency situations limits Hillyard's "second 
situation" too far. In Jensen v. Mountain States Tel. and 
Tel. Co., 611 P.2d 363, 366 (Utah 1980), this Court recently 
put the "emergency" limitation to rest: 
Mountain Bell maintains that the language in 
Hillyard, discussing emergency situations indicates 
that it is only in such situations that the negli-
gence of the first actor can remain active so as to 
constitute a concurring proximate cause together 
with the negligence of the later actor. However, a 
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close reading of Hillyard as well as the treatment 
of the Hillyard rule in later cases leads us to the 
conclusion that the true basis of the rule rests on 
the concept of the legal forseeability of the subse-
quent negligence. The reference to emergency situa-
tions is based more on the factual setting presented 
in Hillyard than on limiting application of the rule 
only to emergency situations. This conclusion is 
strengthened by this Court's latest treatment of the 
Hillyard rule found in Watters v. Querry. Although 
Watters involved a situation where the driver of a 
car stopped abruptly, the words "emergency situa-
tion" are nowhere mentioned. 
Thus Instruction No. 14 is further fatally flawed by its 
erroneous emphasis on the necessity of an emergency situation. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE RULED BUS 
DRIVER LOOSEMORE NEGLIGENT AS A MATTER OF 
LAW 
Respondents seek to excuse bus driver Loosemore's ac-
tions; a brief response is appropriate. 
1. Improper lookout. 
Loosemore testified that he looked in his mirrors 300 
feet from the waiting passenger. He only recalled seeing a 
light colored station wagon on the road behind him. He re-
called no others specifically, except perhaps "back down the 
road farther" than the light colored station wagon. {R. 
617-18). In any event the light colored station wagon was 
the only vehicle that he felt he "would have to look out for 
a nd keep safe • " { R. 61 7 ) • 
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Respondents argue that "it was disputed whether the jeep 
would even have been in the immediate range of the mirror 
when the stop was made," as they claim the jeep was further 
back than the light colored station wagon. (Respondents' 
Brief, pp. 22-23). 
In fact every witness to the accident places the jeep 
immediately behind the bus, with the light colored station 
wagon behind the jeep. (See, eg, Hollingshead, R. 576-78; 
Myers, R. 591-93). Thus, Loosemore failed to see the vehicle 
first affected by his stop, and never looked again at his 
mirrors until he heard the screech of the jeep's brakes. (R. 
629-630). 
2. Stopping on the highway. 
Respondents concede that §41-6-101, Utah Code Ann. (1953) 
sets the standard of care in this case as to the location of 
Loosemore's stop, and that violation of that statute is 
negligence absent reasonable justification or excuse. 
(Respondents' Brief, pp 18-19). That statute provides, in 
relevant part: 
[N]o person shall stop, park, or leave standing any 
vehicle, whether attended or unattended, upon the 
paved or main traveled part of the highway when it 
is practical to stop, park, or so leave such vehicle 
off such part of said highway, but in every event an 
unobstructed width of the highway opposite a stand-
ing vehicle shall be left for the free passage of 
other vehicles and a clear view of such stopped 
vehicle shall be available from a distance of 200 
feet in each direction upon such highway. 
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A. Unobstructed width of highway; 200 feet of clear view. 
Under that statute "a driver must always park off the 
highway when practical to do; the other requirements of clear 
view and sufficient passing space are not pertinent unless 
and until it is shown that it is impractical to park off the 
highway at the particular place in question." Horrocks v. 
Rounds, 370 P.2d 799 (N.M. 1962); McElhanex v. Rouse, 415 
P.2d 241 {Kan. 1966). 
Therefore, respondents' arguments of visibility and unob-
structed adjacent highway (Respondents' Brief, pp. 3, 17) are 
without merit unless it was impractical for Loosemore to have 
pulled off the highway. 
B. "Impractical." 
Many reported cases deal with statutes of other states 
which are identical in wording with §41-6-101, Utah Code Ann. 
(1953). For example, Chard v. Bowen, 427 P.2d 568, (Idaho 
1967), discusses those factors which might excuse compliance 
with the statute, stating: 
To prove that a violation of a statute was ex-
cusable or justifiable so as to overcome the pre-
sumption of negligence, the evidence must support a 
finding that the violation resulted from causes or 
things that made compliance with the statute impos-
sible, something over which the person charged with 
the violation had no control which placed his vehi-
cle in a position violative of the statute, or an 
emergency not of such person's own making by reason 
of which he fails to obey the statute, and that the 
person who violated the statute did what might rea-
sonably be expected of a person of ordinary prudence 
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who desired to comply with the law, acting under 
similar circumstances. Id. at 574 (emphasis added). 
c. Evidence. 
Loosemore's "justification" for stopping where he did 
must be reasonable; it cannot be frivolous. If he presented 
no evidence of reasonable justification a directed negligence 
finding against him is appropriate. As justification, he 
claims the following:, 
1. "He felt unsafe ••• because of a large ditch 
which adjoined the shoulder of the road." (Repondents' 
brief, p. 17, citing Loosemore's testimony at R. 623-24.) 
Yet on the very next transcript page, p. 625, Loosemore 
qualified his statement after being shown photographs of the 
accident scene. He then stated there was, in fact, nothing 
that would have prevented him from pulling off another ten 
feet. (R. 625). 
2. His main concern was passenger convenience. 
(R. 622-23, 644). Even assuming that it was more convenient 
for the passenger that Loosemore stop where he did, that con-
cern is frivolous in view of the clear language of the sta-
tute and Loosemore's admission that he could have pulled off 
the traveled portion of the highway. The cited portion of 
Chard v. Bowen, supra, uses terms impossible, or emergency--
not convenience. 
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Even if passenger convenience were a possible justif ica-
tion, Loosemore testified that he stopped 3-4 feet from the 
passenger (R. 627). His own expert, Rudolph Limpert, testi-
fied that, had Loosemore pulled off even two additional feet, 
there would have been no collision (R. 802). 
In General Ins. Co. of America v. Lewis, 121 Utah 440, 
243 P.2d 433 (1952), this Court stated that the statute ap-
plied to those "cases where the driver stops his car on the 
highway from his own choice and has an opportunity to select 
the place and conditions of his stop." 243 P.2d at 434. 
This is just such a case, and Loosemore's lame "justifica-
tions" do not merit submission to the jury. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court erred in holding jeep driver Talbot 
negligent as a matter of law as the facts in evidence pre-
sented a jury question on that issue. Utah case law supports 
the proposition that in "dynamic" fact situations, such as 
this case, all issues of negligence and proximate cause are 
for the jury. 
The trial court erred in its Instruction No. 14 and in 
effect thereby directed judgment against the plaintiffs here-
in. The instruction improperly stated the tests laid down by 
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this Court in Hillyard, Watters and Jensen v. Mountain States 
Telephone. 
Having held Talbot negligent as a matter of law, the 
trial court should have also held defendant Loosemore negli-
gent as a matter of law for his failure to exercise proper 
lookout and for his unexcused illegal stop on the traveled 
portion of the highway, where he admitted there was no reason 
he could not have pulled completely off said highway as re-
quired by §41-6-1, Utah Code Ann. (1953). 
For the foregoing reasons the judgment herein should be 
reversed and vacated and remanded for a new trial on the 
issues which remain. 
Respectfully submitted this 11th day of December, 1981. 
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